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NOTES
THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE APPLIED TO DISCRIMINA
TION IN EMPLOYMENT ADVERTISING-New Yark Times
Co. v. City of New York Commission on Human Rights, 41 N. Y.2d
345, 361 N.E.2d 963, 393 N. Y.S. 312, reargument denied, 42
N.Y.2d 910, 397 N.Y.S.2d 1029 (1977).
During the early 1970's the New York Times routinely pub
lished classified advertisements which offered professional and man
agerial employment in the Republic of South Africa.! In October,
1972, several interested groups2 filed a complaint with the New York

1. The positions offered were either openings on the faculties of various South
African universities or managerial positions with private industrial firms. Several of
the listings solicited executive personnel for the South African subsidiaries of multi
national corporations, including American businesses. Brief for the Appellant at 7,
New York Times Co. v. City of New York Comm'n on Human Rights, 41 N.Y.2d 345,
361 N.E.2d 963, 393 N.Y.S.2d 312, reargument denied, 42 N.Y.2d 910, 397 N.Y.S.2d
1029 (1977). Representative examples of the advertisements were reprinted in an
appendix to the opinion. ld. at 354-56, 361 N.E.2d at 969-70, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 318-19.
Two of these advertisements are reproduced below.
.

NEW YORK TIMES, August 12, 1973

NEW YORK TIMES, August 29, 1971
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There's Opportunity
~ SOUTH AFRICA
in South Africa

World·wide industrial manufacturing and sales organillltion

A leading South African public company

with ambitious growth plans for South Africa seeks a result..
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Afttr" initial training in U. S. , will be based in deslreable :

We offer top salaries plus e~ce!lent fringe benefits including pension fund
and medical aid scheme.

South African location - full relocation expenses paid. •
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...........................................•

Arrange personal interview-telephone Mr. Walter J. Hoff at

(212) 661.5500
01.<'101..... ",(l.''''''!<If .;i ·'.t".... :1'11

.

:
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2. The original complainants were the American Committee on Africa, the Afri
can Heritage Studies ASSOCiation, One Hundred Black Men, Inc., and Judge William
H. Booth.
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City Commission on Human Rights. The complaint alleged that
South African employment laws discriminated against non-whites.
It also alleged that this systematic discrimination was a matter of
common knowledge among the citizens of New York, and that the
Times, by publishing these advertisements, was aiding and abetting
discriminatory job recruitment in violation of the City Human
Rights Law. 3
The Times moved to enjoin the Commission from continuing
with the hearing, but the New York State Supreme Court upheld
the proceeding as a proper exercise of the Commission's jurisdic
tion. 4 The Commission found that the advertisements were dis
criminatory within the meaning of the applicable statutes 5 and or
dered the Times to cease their publication. On review, the New
York Supreme Court vacated the Commission's order,6 holding that
3. Brief for the Appellant, supra note 1, at 8.
4. The Times petition was an Article 78 proceeding under N.Y. CIV. PRAC.
LAW §§ 7801-7806 (McKinney 1972). It sought to dismiss the hearing on the ground
that the scope of its merits exceeded the jurisdiction of the Commission because it
infringed on the exclusive foreign affairs jurisdiction of the federal government. In re
New York Times Co. v. City of New York Comm'n on Human Rights, 76 Misc. 2d 17,
17-18,349 N.Y.S.2d 940, 942 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1973).
5. The statute provides as follows:
§ BI-7.0 Unlawful discriminatory practices:
1. It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice:

* * * *
(d) For any employer or employment agency to print or circulate or
cause to be printed or circulated any statement, advertisement or publica
tion, or to use any form of application for employment or to make any in
quiry in connection with prospective employment, which expresses, directly
or indirectly, any limitation, specification or discrimination as to age, race,
creed, color, national origin or sex, or any intent to make any such limitation,
specification or discrimination, unless based upon a bona fide occupational
qualification.

* * * *
6. It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to aid,
abet, incite, compel or coerce the dOing of any of the acts forbidden under
this title, or to attempt to do so.

* * * *

N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE §§ BI-7.0(1)(d), .0(6) (1976).
6. New York Times Co. v. City of New York Comm'n on Human Rights, 79
Misc. 2d 1046, 362 N.Y.S.2d 321 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1974). As respondent, the
Times was granted review against the Commission under a provision of New York
City law which allows judicial review of the Commission's actions by the New York
State Supreme Court for any complainant, respondent, or aggrieved party. N.Y. CITY
ADMIN. CODE § BI-9.0 (1976). The original complainants were granted leave to
intervene.
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the advertisements contained no discriminatory language. 7 It also
found that the injunction constituted an impermissible examination
of foreign law and an intrusion into the foreign affairs power of the
federal government. 8 The appellate division endorsed this view
without change in a memorandum decision. 9
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
lower courts in New York Times Co. v. City of New York Commis
sion on Human Rights.1° It held that the mere reference to South
Africa as the situs of employment in help-wanted advertisements
was not an expression of discrimination proscribed by the muni
cipal statute.ll A plurality of the court,12 in an opinion by Justice
Jasen, supported its decision by invoking the act of state doctrine,
which prohibits the judiciary from inquiring into the validity of the
public acts of a foreign state committed within its own territory.13
Neither the court's analysis of the message conveyed by the
advertisements nor its reliance on the act of state doctrine provides
a satisfactory explanation of the result. The conclusion that the ad
vertisements did not express employment discrimination reflects an
unpenetrating interpretation of both the language and purpose of
the statute. Reliance on the act of state doctrine, on the other
hand, demonstrates an acute concern for the motivations sup
posedly underlying the complaint. As a result of a confusing syn
thesis of the doctrine with other general principles of federalism,
the court, misperceiving the inherent limitations on its use, em
ployed the doctrine in a context which did not warrant its applica
tion.

7. New York Times Co. v. City of New York Comm'n on Human Rights, 79
Misc. 2d 1046, 1048,362 N.Y.S.2d 321,324 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1974).
8. Id. at 1050, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 326.
9. New York Times Co. v. City of New York Comm'n on Human Rights, 49
App. Div. 2d 851, 374 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1975).
10. 41 N.Y.2d 345, 361 N.E.2d 963, 393 N.Y.S.2d 312, reargument denied, 42
N.Y.2d 910,397 N.Y.S.2d 1029 (1977).
11. Id. at 350, 361 N.E.2d at 966, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
12. Two justices of the seven-member court concurred in the opinion of Justice
Jasen. A separate concurring opinion by Justice Jones was endorsed by one of his
colleagues and professed not to "reach or consider the international relations or
foreign affairs aspects of the case addressed in the majority opinion." Id. at 357, 361
N.E.2d at 970,393 N.Y.S.2d at 319. Justices Fuchsberg and Cooke joined in dissent.
13. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Underhill v.
Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897). The act of state doctrine is discussed in the text
accompanying notes 43-64 infra.
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THE EXPRESSION OF DISCRIMINATION
IN EMPLOYMENT ADVERTISING

The New York City Commission on Human Rights is the
municipal agency which has the primary statutory responsibility for
eliminating unlawful discrimination.14 It has broadly defined power
to enforce the city's antidiscrimination laws,15 which specifically
prohibit the printing of any advertisement that "expresses, directly
or indirectly," any limitation based on race.1 6 The statute also
makes it unlawful for any person to aid or abet any of the pro
scribed discriminatory practices. 17
The question before the Commission was whether the Times
was liable under the statute for printing advertisements which,
without explicit reference to discrimination in opportunity, desig
nated "South Africa" as the location of the offered employment.
The Commission found that the undisputed evidence presented by
the complainants 18 demonstrated two main points: 1) The laws of
14. The Commission has the power to
eliminate and prevent discrimination in employment, in places of public ac
commodation, resort or amusement, in housing accommodations and in
commercial space because of race, creed, color, national origin or physical
handicap, and to take other actions against discrimination because of race,
creed, color or national origin, as herein provided; and the commission es
tablished hereunder is he~eby given general jurisdiction and power for such
purposes.
N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § Bl-1.0 (1976).
15. The Commission has the power to hear complaints of unlawful discrimina
tion, to investigate the complaints, and to decide the merits of such complaints. N.Y.
CITY ADMIN. CODE § Bl-5.0(4) (1976).
16. Id. § Bl-7.0(1)(d). See note 5 supra.
17. Id. § Bl-7.0(6). See note 5 supra.
18. The evidence presented to the Commission was noted by the New York
Court of Appeals to have been "undisputed." 41 N.Y.2d at 348, 361 N.E.2d at 965,
393 N.Y.S.2d at 314. It consisted of the testimony of nine witnesses and exhibits of
relevant South African law. The following is a representative sample of the evidence
presented.
A recognized expert in the field of international human rights, Dr. Hugh Smythe,
testified that the South African laws which mandate discrimination are so numerous
that "you can't keep track of them." Record at 121, New York Times Co. v. City of
New York Comm'n on Human Rights, 79 Misc. 2d 1046,362 N.Y.S.2d 321 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1974).
The Population Registration Act, No. 30 of 1950, requires registration of all per
manent residents, including aliens, on the basis of classification by race-either
"white," "Bantu," or "colored." The Industrial Conciliation Act, No. 28 of 1956, sets
out the collective bargaining guidelines for labor unions. It defines "employee" to
exclude blacks, and defines "trade union" to include only "employees." Moreover, it
gives the Minister of Labour the power to restrict certain occupations to members
of a particular racial classification. Under this provision, 27 occupations had been
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South Africa establish and enforce a pervasive scheme of discrimi
nation based on race;19 and 2) the residents of New York City are
aware of the substance and effect of South Africa's laws. 20 The evi
dence demonstrated that New Yorkers, especially blacks, would
understand the words "South Africa" to effectively mean "only
closed to non-whites by 1971. Record, supra, at 300. The Group Areas Act, No. 3£
of 1966, divides the territory of South Africa into specific areas in which only mem
bers of the same race can reside or own land. The Bantu Labour Act, No. 67 of 1964,
regulates black employment and provides administrative procedures whiich con
trol the movement of blacks seeking work. Under a proclamation made pursuant to
the Group Areas Act, Proclamation No. 329 of 1957, prohibits, with limited excep
tions, any black from working as "a charge hand, executive, professional, technical or
administrative employee, manager or supervisor" in a white area. Mr. Joel Carlson,
an international jurist and former South African attorney, testified that, as a result of
the complex employment laws, he had never known of an instance in which a black
man, either South African or alien, was in a position of authority over a white man in
a business situation. Record, supra, at 146. Much of the witnesses' testimony dealt
with New Yorkers' knowledge of South African law and perception of the effect of
the advertisements.
Dr. Smythe reasoned that almost any informed black in the United States would
conclude that the advertisements for positions in South Africa did not apply to
blacks. "South Africa is well-known. When you say 'South Africa' you automatically
think of race discrimination and you know that any jobs like that are not for blacks to
apply to at all." Record, supra, at 120.
Dr. Tilden J. LeMelle, Professor of Politics and International Relations at Hun
ter College, testified about the effect of the general knowledge of apartheid. "Beyond
the futility of applying for it, I along with my colleagues would not want to subject
myself or our families to the conditions under which we would have to live in South
Africa if somehow there was a job available." Record, supra, at 190.
Mrs. Priscilla Bassett, a white librarian whose husband is a black professor, ex
pressed the belief that the advertisements discriminated against both blacks and
whites. Under South African law, she and her husband could not "possibly live ...
under the same roof ... live even in the same community ... (and) certainly not use
any of the public facilities . . . . We would just be totally segregated from one
another." Record, supra, at 193.
Richard C. Clarke, head of a minority recruitment firm, testified that he would
not recommend the advertised positions to his clients and that, furthermore, none
would accept positions in South Africa. Record, supra, at 197-98.
The effect of the Aliens Act, No.1 of 1937, is that only whites are eligible for
visas to immigrate to South Africa. A prominent Harlem attorney, Hope Stevens, tes
tified that the advertisements would be construed by the average black professional
as a "sarcastic and brutal reminder" of the effect of apartheid. The advertisements
would provoke "hostile feelings and would be insulting [by] mockingly presenting to
black Americans opportunities for employment in South Africa ... where every black
person who reads ... the New York Times [understands] that blacks would be bar
red." Record, supra, at 203-04.
For a discussion of much of the evidence presented before the Commission, see
Brief for the Appellant, supra note 1, at 12-23.
19. See Brief for the Appellant, supra note 1, at 19-23; 41 N.Y.2d at 357-58,361
N.E.2d at 970-71,393 N.Y.S.2d at 320 (dissenting opinion). See note 18 supra.
20. See Brief for the Appellant, supra note 1, at 12-19.
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whites need apply." The Commission concluded that the adver
tisements constituted an expression of racial limitation on the jobs
offered and that the Times, by printing the solicitations, helped to
foster unlawful discrimination.
The New York Court of Appeals upheld the reversal by the
lower courts, whose decision in part was founded on the belief that
it was necessary to demonstrate intent by the Times to participate
in a program of discrimination. 21 The intent requirement is not
expressed in the New York City Code. 22 Moreover, the cases re
quiring this element for liability relied on by the lower courts had
been overruled by the New York Court of Appeals. 23 Choosing not
to address the aiding and abetting issue in the instant case,24 the
21. New York Times Co. v. City of New York Comm'n on Human Rights, 79
Misc. 2d 1046, 1049, 362 N.Y.S.2d 321, 324 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1974). See Com
ment, The Act of State Doctrine: International Consensus and Public Policy
Considerations-New York Times Co. v. City of New York, Commission on Human
Rights, 8 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 283 (1975). The court found the intent require
ment in two cases interpreting a New York State statute, N.Y. EXEC. LAw §§ 290-301
(McKinney 1972), which is similar to the municipal law proscribing discrimination in
employment advertisements. The cases involved challenges to the segregation of
help-wanted advertisements by sex. National Organization for Women v. Gannett
Co., 40 App. Div. 2d 107, 338 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1972), rev'd sub nom. NationalOrgani
zation for Women v. State Div. of Human Rights, 34 N.Y.2d 416, 314 N.E.2d 867, 358
N.Y.S.2d 124 (1974), held that the liability of a publisher for aiding and abetting
unlawful discrimination "requires that it be established that there was a knowledge
able and intentional participation on its part in the unlawful conduct charged." Id. at
116-17,338 N.Y.S.2d at 579.
In National Organization for Women v. Buffalo Courier-Express, 71 Misc. 2d
917, 337 N.Y.S.2d 608 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1972), a New York Supreme Court
found similarly that" 'an aider and abettor must share the intent or purpose of the
principal actor, and there can be no partnership in an act where there is no commun
ity of purpose.' " Id. at 919, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 611 (quoting 1 W. BURDICK, THE LAw
OF CRIME § 221, at 297 (1946)).
22. N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § BI-7.0(6) (1976). See note 5 supra.
23. The New York Court of Appeals reversed National Organization for Women
v. Gannett Co., 40 App. Div. 2d lO7, 338 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1972), rev'd sub nom. Na
tional Organization for Women v. State Div. of Human Rights, 34 N.Y.2d 416, 314
N.E.2d 867, 358 N.Y.S.2d 124 (1974), (and, by implication, National Organization for
Women v. Buffalo Courier-Express, 71 Misc. 2d 917, 337 N.Y.S.2d 608 (Sup. Ct. Erie
County 1972)), finding the intent element unnecessary.
It held that a newspaper is liable for aiding and abetting if it "reinforces the
very discriminatory practices which the Federal and State antidiscrimination laws
were meant to 'eliminate." National Organization for Women v. State Div. of Human
Rights, 34 N.Y.2d 416, 422, 314 N.E.2d 867,871,358 N.Y.S.2d 124, 128 (1974).
24. A possible explanation for this apparent inconsistency is that the New York
Court of Appeals found it necessary to rule on the issue of specific intent only in
sofar as it related to the particular discrimination claimed in the N .O.W. cases: sex
segregated help-wanted advertisements. At the time of the lower courts' decisions in
those cases, the State Division of Human Rights had developed a policy which al
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Court of Appeals concentrated on a strict analysis of the statutory
language. Because the "advertisements at issue here never once
referred, even obliquely, to any discriminatory limitations,"25 they
did not "express" discrimination. 26 Mention of "South Mrica" was
necessary to the legitimate purpose of the advertisements because
it conveyed essential information, the place of offered employment.
The dissent, focusing its analysis on the effect communicated
to the Times' readership by the words "South Africa," found that
the advertisements conveyed a discriminatory message. Objecting
to a mere surface examination of the content of language, the dis
sent criticized the majority's approach because it "would seem to
overlook the reality"27 of the discrimination practiced. 28 The un
disputed evidence cqntained in the record29 indicated that the
message perceived by the Times' readers was not limited to the
surface, geographic meaning of the words "South Mrica." Rather,
the readers simultaneously perceived the racial restriction implicit
in the message conveyed by the term.
Central to the dispute between the dissent and majority was
the degree to which the connotative meaning of language was to be
given effect.30 The members of the court differed over whether the
lowed employment advertisement sections designated by sex as long as the news
paper published a notice disclaiming any intent to discriminate by this organization
of its copy. A decision by the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue
squarely and held that disclaimer notices could not mitigate the discriminatory effect
of this type of advertisement. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413
U.S. 376, 381 (1973). Thus, the overruling of the N.O.W. cases brought the New York
policy within the directive of the Pittsburgh Press ruling.
This does not, however, explain the great weight given by the lower courts in
the instant case to the element of intent as a requirement for liability, nor does it
adequately explain the reluctance of New York's highest court to address the issue.
There are significant similarities in the cases. First, although the N.O.W. cases dealt
with a state law, the municipal statute considered here is similar in purpose, scope,
and language. Second, both situations involve the responsibility of a newspaper to
the general community for the possible discriminatory effects of the organization of its
advertising copy.
25. 41 N.Y.2d at 350, 361 N.E.2d at 967,393 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
26. In this view, the "test under the advertising subdivision is not whether
actual discrimination is practiced." Id.
27. Id. at 359, 361 N.E.2d at 971, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 321.
28. "Discrimination today is rarely so obvious or its practices so overt that rec
ognition of the fact is instant and conclusive." State Div. of Human Rights v. Kilian
Mfg. Corp., 35 N.Y.2d 201, 209, 318 N.E.2d 770, 774, 360 N.Y.S.2d 603, 609 (1974),
cited in 41 N.Y.2d at 359,361 N.E.2d at 971-72, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 321.
29. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
30. What the dissent viewed as recognition of the underlying practical reality,
the majority interpreted as an impermissible inference.
The advertisements complained of in this proceeding do not express any
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principle that the antidiscrimination statutes cannot be circum
vented by the use of "code words" applied to the facts of the in
stant case.
The restriction on the use of "code words" recognizes that
some terms used in advertising, while neutral on their face, never
theless effectively discriminate because of their connotation. The
courts of many jurisdictions, including New York, have found it
necessary to liberally construe remedial legislation31 to prohibit
discriminatory advertising language. In a leading New York case,
Camp-of-the-Pines, Inc. v. New York Times Co. ,32 an advertise
ment which included the phrase "selected clientele" was found to
be discriminatory in its effect. The court held that use of"selected
clientele" operated as an indirect means of expressing discrimina
tion. 33 Acting on the belief that the remedial purpose of the legisla
tion required liberal construction of its provisions,34 the court fo
cused on the practical effect of the advertisements. The fact that
the language was denotatively innocuous did not control. Its conno
tation was understood to discriminate, and so violated the statute.
This approach to statutory construction looks beyond the surface
content of language to its practical effect. 35
discrimination of any kind, directly or indirectly. The complainants, never
theless, would draw an inference, as a matter of law, that since the location
of the employment was a country that discriminates on the basis of color,
advertisements for employment located within that country must, therefore,
carry with them an implication of discrimination.
41 N.Y.2d at 350, 361 N.E.2d at 967, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
31. The city's antidiscrimination statutes seek to eradicate practices which
"threaten the rights and proper privileges of its inhabitants and menace the institu
tions and foundation of a free democratic state." N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § B1-1.0
(1976). See note 14 supra.
New York courts have held that the state's civil rights law must be liberally
construed because of its remedial nature. In Hobson v. York Studios, Inc., 208 Misc.
888, 145 N.Y.S.2d 162 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1955), plaintiffs sought to recover statutory
damages from the defendant who refused to rent a hotel room to plaintiffs because of
their race. The Municipal Court of the City of New York found discrimination and
stated that "it is idle to urge a strict and inflexible construction of the law simply
because it is penal in nature. A liberal intent conceived the statute. The proper office
of civil rights legislation is to search out hostility to our public policy and apply the
proper remedy." [d. at 892, 145 N.Y.S.2d at 166.
32. 184 Misc. 389, 53 N.Y.S.2d 475 (Sup. Ct. Albany COllnty 1945).
33. [d. at 398, 53 N.Y.S.2d at 484. Evidence included a letter written by the
camp's agent to a prospective guest which explained the membership requirement as
a device to insure screening of applicants and compliance with the law. This scheme
was justified by the belief "that those on vacation have a better time if with people
of their own kind...." [d.
34. [d. at 397, 53 N.Y.S.2d at 483.
35. "As a practical matter slIch words as 'selected clientele' connote in the pub
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The majority distinguished the situation in the instant case
from Camp-of-the-Pines and other "code word" decisions. 36 In its
view, a prohibited code word is an addition which adds nothing but
invidious unfairness to an otherwise complete advertisement. 37 The
use of "South Mrica" was protected because it conveyed necessary
information. Thus, the majority established a test which requires
that a "coded" expression of discrimination must contain non
essential information.
This approach denies the significance of the advertisement's
effect on prospective New York black applicants, for whom the
words "South Mrica" primarily connote the lack of equal opportu
nity inherent in that country's policy of apartheid, and only secon
darily convey geographic information. 38 "[A] word which signals

lic mind that colored persons, Jews and others who are not lily-white need not apply
to plaintiff for accommodation." ld. at 398,53 N.Y.S.2d at 484.
36. A federal district court in Illinois held that the existence of an otherwise
legitimate motive did not protect the publication of a preference which had the ef
fect of discriminating against a class of persons by use of a "code word." In
Holmgren v. Little Village Community Reporter, 342 F. Supp. 512 (N.D. Ill. 1971),
newspapers were enjoined from printing classified advertisements which indicated a
preference to rent to tenants who spoke a particular language. The cause of action
arose under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c), which is the advertising section of the fede~al
housing discrimination law. The defendant's claim that the preference was expressed
only to facilitate communication between landlord and tenant did not excuse the
discriminatory effect of the advertisement. 342 F. Supp. at 513.
In an action against a newspaper which published an advertisement for an
apartment in a "white home," the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit em
phasized the remedial nature of the antidiscrimination legislation. In United States v.
Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1972), the court held that although a private
homeowner was permitted by 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b), which creates limited exceptions
to the housing discrimination act, to discriminate by refusing to sell or rent to par
ticular groups, this exercise of preference did not embrace a right to publicize that
discriminatory intent. 459 F.2d at 213-14. To evaluate the effect of the questioned
language, the court looked to what the "natural interpretation of the advertisements"
would be to "the ordinary reader." It concluded, "If an advertiser could use the
phrase 'white home' in substitution for the clearly proscribed 'white only,' the statute
would be nullified for all practical purposes." ld. at 215.
37. 41 N.Y.2d at 351,361 N.E.2d at 967, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
38. Other areas of the law have recognized that the "secondary" meaning of a
word can be more significant that its "primary" meaning. In trademark law, for
example, a product designation which originally has as its "primary" meaning a geo
graphic place or personal name may acquire through use and association a "secon
dary" meaning in the public mind. "The phrase 'secondary meaning,' as thus used,
does not mean a subordinate or rare significance. It means rather a subsequent sig
nificance added to the previous meaning of the designation and becoming in the
market its usual and primary significance." In litigation on this point, the issue is
whether a substantial number of the buying public associates the term, in its market
context, not in its "primary" geographic sense, but as designating the product or
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discrimination does so no less because it conveys other information
as well. "39
The effect of the court's interpretation of the terms of the New
York City antidiscrimination statute is to restrict the Commission's
ability to carry out the remedial purpose of the legislation: to
eliminate the insidious effect of discrimination in the city. This law
demands an approach which reflects a consciousness of both the
broad remedial nature of the legislation and the practical effect of
the conduct it regulates. In the reasoning of the dissent, "it is the
duty of the courts to make sure that the salutory purposes of the
legislative body in enacting the human rights law of the City of
New York are not thwarted by a combination of a strict construc
tion of the [statute] and a battle over semantics. "40
At the conclusion of its restrictive analysis of the statute, the
majority found it necessary to interject a commentary which is both
instructive and troublesome. After expounding a strict construction
of the statute, limiting its analysis to an objective, surface examina
tion of the language of the advertisements, Justice Jasen's opinion
did not hesitate to look beneath the surface to judge what it found
to be the underlying political motives of the complainants. It found
that the discriminatory effect of the advertisements on black New
Yorkers "is not at the heart of this case. The reality is that com
plainants seek to impose an economic boycott aimed at the present
government of the Republic of South Africa. "41 The attitude
suggested by this inconsistent reasoning reflects the concern with
the second rationale for the court's decision, the act of state doc
trine. In the view of the plurality, the Commission, by enjoining
the Times, was in effect creating "its own foreign policy. "42

II. THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
The act of state doctrine is a policy of deference by United
States courts to the acts of foreign governments. 43 It rests broadly
service itself. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 716, Comment b (1938). See also American
Waltham Watch Co. v. United States Watch Co., 173 Mass. 85, 53 N.E. 141 (1899).
39. 41 N.Y.2d at 360,361 N.E.2d at 972,393 N.Y.S.2d at 321 (Fuchsberg, J., and
Cooke, J., dissenting).
40. [d. at 357,361 N.E.2d at 970,393 N.Y.S.2d at 319.
41. [d. at 351, 361 N.E.2d at 968,393 N.Y.S.2d at 317.
42. [d.
43. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964). See general
ly, Annot., 12 A.L.R. FED. 707 (1972); Gordon, The Origin and Development of the
Act of State Doctrine, 8 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 595 (1977); Zander, The Act of State Doc
trine, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 826 (1959).
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on two general principles, comity and diplomatic expediency. 44
They form the basic rationale of the classic statement of the doc
trine by the United States Supreme Court in Underhill v. Hernan
dez,45 where the Court held that the acts of a recognized foreign
government, performed within its own territory, could not be
questioned by American courts.
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will
not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another
done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of
such acts must be obtained through the means open to be
availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves. 46

The concept of comity47 reflects the traditional political respect be
tween nations. The language of Underhill and earlier statements
foreshadowing the act of state doctrine 48 also suggest that long
standing respect for the principle of sovereign immunity was a sig
nificant factor in its development. 49 The Underhill opinion reflects
a policy that in matters of foreign relations diplomatic expediency is
best served by judicial deference to the political branches of gov
ernment. Redress of private grievances against a sovereign state
could best be handled by negotiated settlement through diplomatic
channels. Under this policy, the judiciary should refrain from any
action which might embarrass the executive branch or otherwise
44. Underhill v. Hernandez, 65 F. 577, 579 (2d Cir. 1895), aff'd, 168 U.S. 250
(1897).
"Considerations of comity and of the highest expediency require that the con
duct of states, whether in transactions with other states or with individuals, their own
citizens or foreign citizens, should not be called in question by the legal tribunals of
another jurisdiction." Id.
45. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
46. The Court refused to consider the merits of a suit by an American who
alleged damages suffered as a result of his coerced detention in Venezuela by a
military commander of a revolutionary government. Id. at 252.
47. Comity is the respect and recognition afforded a nation by the other mem
bers of the international community as regards the sovereignty of acts within its own
boundaries. It gives "due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to
the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its
laws." Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895).
48. Hudson v. Guestier, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 293 (1808).
49. The immunity accorded a foreign state is available as a defense to adjudica
tion on the merits of a claim against the sovereign in another state. A court may
dismiss the suit on grounds of sovereign immunity without considering the act of
state doctrine. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE
UNITED STATES § 41, Comment e (1965).
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hinder it in carrying out the foreign affairs function of govern
ment. 50
Historically, the act of state doctrine has been invoked in lim
ited circumstances. The expropriation of property or nationalization
of business assets by a state within its own territory are the typical
situations which have triggered its application. 51 In these instances,
the doctrine, reflecting the principle of comity and the preference
for diplomatic settlement, has functioned reasonably well within
the framework of the separation of powers. Traditional application
of the act of state doctrine, however, has produced harsh results.
In later cases, the courts have attempted to more narrowly define
the circumstances in which the doctrine would be utilized.
Three limitations have been suggested. They would recognize
the following considerations: 1) The public policy of the United
States; 2) recognition of international law; and 3) commercial acts of
a foreign government. These proposed limitations have in common
a choice of law philosophy which would permit a court to balance
the legitimate competing interest against those factors which de
mand application of the act of state doctrine. The effect of each
limitation would be to qualify the act of state doctrine and mitigate
the harsh results which have occurred in cases where courts have
been required by a strict application of the doctrine to abstain from
hearing the merits of a claim.
Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme 52 illustrates
50. [d. § 41, Comment c. See generally id. § 41, Comments band d.
51. Two cases arising from the Mexican Revolution of 1913 illustrate the tra
ditional application of the doctrine. In Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297
(1918), the property of the plaintiff was confiscated by the revolutionary forces of
Francisco Villa, sold, transported to the United States, and resold. Bringing suit in
New Jersey, Oetjen sought to replevy his illegally seized property. The Supreme
Court expanded the application of Underhill to deny recovery. Although the suit was
between private litigants concerning property located in the United States, the Court
declined to consider the merits of the claim. [d. at 303-04.
The Court followed a similar approach in Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246
U.S. 304 (1918), which involved a dispute over title to lead bullion seized by the
revolutionary army in Mexico. The case did not tum on the question of jurisdiction,
as it would if principles of sovereign immunity were applied. See generally Com
ment, The jurisdictional Immunity of Foreign Sovereigns, 63 YALE L.J. 1148 (1954).
The Court held that because the act of a foreign sovereign was involved in the dis
position of the property, the "details of such action or the merit of the result" were
beyond the power of the United States courts. 246 U.S. at 309. The act of state doc
trine operated to preclude the court of the forum nation from inquiring into the va
lidity of the dispute, regardless of its jurisdiction, if the resol ution of the matter
touched on foreign governmental authority.
52. 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1947).
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the extreme deference required of the judiciary by the act of state
doctrine. The Nazi government had expropriated property, notably
that of Jews, including the corporate assets of plaintiff. A ship
which had been part of the property taken from plaintiff Bernstein
was sold to the defendant, a Belgian corporation, and sank during
World War II. Insurance proceeds on the ship were located in
New York, and Bernstein, then a resident of that state, attached
the proceeds. The attachment was quashed and the decision up
held on the basis of the act of state doctrine. The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit suggested the possibility of a public policy
limitation to the doctrine which would operate in the context of a
conflict of laws situation and permit the court to give weight to the
public policy interest of the forum. 53 In the final analysis, however,
the court concluded that the rigidity of the act of state doctrine did
not afford the judiciary the same latitude presented by an orthodox
conflict of laws problem. 54 The court interpreted the doctrine to
require its deference in the absence of an explicit grant of authority
from the executive branch in any particular case. 55
A second limitation, based on recognition of international law,
was presented in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino 56 where
the former owners of sugar which had been confiscated by the Cas
tro regime after the Cuban revolution were held not entitled to
recover the proceeds from its subsequent sale. The Supreme Court
rejected the decision of the lower courts which considered the exis
tence of an established international law an appropriate factor in
determining whether the act of state doctrine applied. Under this
view, United States courts would not be required by the doctrine
to give effect to a foreign governmental act which had been judged
illegal by a formal international resolution. 57 Although the Sab
53. Id. at 249-50.
54. Id. at 250-52. In subsequent similar litigation involVing other ships of Bern
stein, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit applied the public policy excep
tion which it considered and rejected here. This occurred after the court received ex
press notice from the State Department that it considered American courts free in
"the exercise of their jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the acts of Nazi officials."
Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Americkaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210
F.2d 375, 376 (2d Cir. 1954).
55. J63 F.2d at 251.
56. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
57. The United Nations Charter, for example, obligates member nations to
further "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." U.N.
CHARTER art. 55(c). The United States has ,signed several international resolutions
condemning racial discrimination, including the International Convention on the
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batino decision once again reaffirmed the traditional formulation of
the act of state doctrine, 58 it is significant that the Court did ad
dress the question of the possible need for its revision. Dicta in
Justice Harlan's opinion carefully suggested both the possibility of
the international law exception and an overall reevaluation of the
separation of powers rationale underlying the doctrine. 59 In addi
tion, Justice White, in a strong dissent, urged the adoption of the
proposed limitation. He objected to a wooden application of the act
of state doctrine which gives effect to a foreign act when that act
represents a clear and recognizable breach of international law. 60
The avenues for change sketched in Sabbatino have not been
developed, as the most recent case dealing with the doctrine to
reach the Supreme Court demonstrates. Alfred Dunhill of London,
Inc. v. Republic of Cuba 61 involved the nationalization of privately
owned industry by the Castro government. The Court was pre
sented with a third opportunity to restrict the application of the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1966, which calls for the condem
nation of racial discrimination in all its forms. Article 6 of the Convention provides
that "States Parties shall assure to everyone within their jurisdiction effective protec
tion and remedies, through the competent national tribunals and other State institu
tions, against any acts of racial discrimination which violate his human rights and
fundamental freedoms contrary to this Convention. . . ." J.G. CASTEL, INTERNA
TIONAL LAw 541 (3d ed. 1976).
58. Congress reacted to the Supreme Court's decision in Sabbatino by enact
ing the Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, 22 U.S.C.
§ 2370(e)(2). The constitutionality of this amendment was challenged unsuccessfully
in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), afI'd, 383 F.2d
166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968). The amendment allows a court
to consider the legality under international law of the act of a foreign state unless the
executive branch formally makes known that examination by the courts in the par
ticular case would hinder the government in the conduct of foreign affairs. See
French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46,242 N.E.2d 704, 295 N.Y.S.2d 433
(1968).
59. 376 U.S. at 431-33. In an apparent attempt to free the judiciary, at least in
theory, from its historical position of almost total deference under the doctrine, dicta
in Sabbatino suggests an independent power in the judiciary under the Constitution
to make law affecting foreign relations. Id. at 427. See Henkin, The Foreign
Affairs Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 805 (1964).
60. 376 U.S. at 443-44. In his dissent, Justice White criticized the judicial def
erence required by the act of state doctrine, and suggested that the courts are com
petent to pass on international law, which is part of the body of American law.
No other civilized country has found such a rigid rule necessary for the sur
vival of the executive branch of its government; the executive of no other
government seems to require such insulation from international law adjudi
cations in its courts; and no other judiciary is apparently so incompetent to
ascertain and apply international law.
Id. at 440 (footnote omitted).
61. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
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doctrine by creating a limitation based on the purely commercial
nature of the act of a foreign state. 62 Despite a letter from the
State Department recommending the change,63 the Court refused
to accept the creation of the commercial act exception. 64
The act of state doctrine remains essentially in the form articu
lated by the Supreme Court in Underhill and restated in Sab
batino. It requires deference by the courts in the interest of politi
cal and diplomatic expediency, and reflects respect for the values of
international comity and for the ideals of the separation of powers.
However, regardless of the refusal of the Supreme Court to specifi
cally narrow its scope, the traditional application of the act of state
doctrine has significant limitations, which were given little effect by
the New York Times Company court.

III.

ANALYSIS: THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE ApPLIED TO
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ADVERTISING

The court in the present case applied the act of state doctrine
to a situation unlike those in which it has previously been used. By
its own terms, the doctrine requires judicial deference only when.a
court encounters a public act of a foreign government committed
within its own territory. In addition, the doctrine historically has
been invoked in limited circumstances, typically involving transna
tional property disputes. 65 In these instances, the doctrine, reflect
ing the principle of comity and the preference for diplomatic set
tlement, has functioned reasonably well within the framework of
62. The fonner owners of nationalized cigar finns, having ·fled to the United
States, sought payment for shipments which had been received by Dunhill, a cigar
importer. Dunhill had mistakenly paid an agency of the Cuban government for cer
tain shipments, and the issue became whether refusal to repay those sums consti
tuted an act of state. Although the Court held that refusal to pay a commercial debt
was not itself an act of state, it reaffirmed its basic position that courts are prohibited
by the doctrine from questioning the public acts of a foreign government done
within its own territory.
63. See id. at 696-97, 706-11 app. 1.
64. Creation of the commercial act exception was advocated in the opinion by
Justice White. Id. at 695-96.
65. The limitations of the act of state doctrine are illustrated by the interpreta
tion of the New York Court of Appeals in J. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank
(Uganda) Ltd., 37 N.Y.2d 220, 333 N.E.2d 168, 371 N.Y.S.2d 892, cert. denied, 423
U.S. 866 (1975). The court found the doctrine inapplicable after deciding that the
cause of action concerning the validity of letters of credit arose in New York. Notice
of repudiation of the letters of credit was given in New York, and the court found
that this gave rise to the action outside the territory of the foreign government. The
challenge to the validity of the repudiation did not constitute an act of state encom
passed by the doctrine.
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the separation of powers. Even in circumstances which conform to
the limited fact situations in which the doctrine has traditionally
been invoked, the deference required by its application often pro
duces harsh results 66 because it forecloses judicial consideration of
the merits of the dispute.
The reliance on the act of state doctrine by the court in the
principal case was misplaced. Its application outside the traditional
context illustrates the inflexibility in the operation of the doctrine.
At issue was, not a property right, but the basic human right of
equal access to employment opportunities. The deference com
pelled by the act of state doctrine foreclosed full consideration by
the local legal system of its own policy against racial discrimination.
In addition, the elements required by the doctrine were not pre
sent. The act of a foreign state committed within its own ter
ritory-the laws of South Africa, in this instance-was not at
issue. The focus of the complaint, and the discriminatory practice
the Commission sought to arrest by enjoining the Times, occurred
in New York, not in Johannesburg. 67 The court gave little effect to
this distinction. The opinion by Justice Jasen, reflecting a convic
tion that the suit was prompted by ulterior, political motives, 68
misinterpreted the thrust or' the complaint and the relief granted
by the Commission. 69 The majority of the court appeared to be
primarily concerned with the discrimination practiced in South Af
rica rather than the effect of local advertisements on job applicants
in New York. In this view, the issue of the enforcement of New
York City's antidiscrimination laws became commingled with the
validity of apartheid itself, a question not presented by the com
plaint.
The confusion of the specific issues was compounded by the
court's concurrent discussion of the act of state doctrine and the
principle that state courts "may not launch inquiries into the right
eousness of foreign law .... "70 The latter principle is similar to the
act of state doctrine to the extent that it reflects concern for the
66. See text accompanying notes 52 and 53 supra.
67. "The claim that the City Human Rights Law prevail is to be distinguished
from an attempt to decide what law shall be enforced in South Africa." Brief for the
Appellant, supra note 1, at 34.
68. See text accompanying notes 41 and 42 supra.
69. In the view of the majority, "it may well be that employment solicitation at
the place of solicitation, New York, is nondiscriminatory, while the actual discrimina
tion occurs at the place of employment, South Africa." 41 N.Y.2d at 351, 361 N.E.2d
at 967, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
70. ld. at 352, 361 N.E.2d at 968, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 317.
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values of federalism and the separation of powers. It defines limits
on the power of state courts, in the exercise of their recognized
functions, to examine and construe foreign law. It is an expression
of the general principle that the power to conduct foreign relations
resides exclusively in the federal government. 71 The court in the
instant case relied on Zschernig v. Miller,72 where the United
States Supreme Court invalidated an Oregon statute which denied
a non-resident alien the right to inherit property in Oregon unless
the laws of the alien's nation conferred a corresponding right on
the citizens of Oregon. It held that state courts could not inquire
into and comment upon the political ideologies of foreign nations.
Justice Stewart, in concurrence, recognized the need for state
courts to "routinely construe foreign law in the resolution of con
troversies properly before them, "73 and objected to the procedure
in Zschernig only because the application of the Oregon statute
forced the courts to exceed a routine examination of the foreign
law. 74
Zschernig represents the outer limits of proscribed inquiry by
state courts into foreign law. 75 It had been previously construed by
the New York Court of Appeals to allow New York courts to
routinely examine foreign law. 76 By citing this authority in the in
stant case in the context of its discussion of the act of state doc
trine, the New York Court of Appeals distorted the value of the
limited principle of Zschernig. No more than a cursory examination
of South African law was required to demonstrate its content and
effect. 77 The existence and secondary effect on New Yorkers of
71. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 68 (1940). See also United States v. Bel
mont, 301 U.S. 324 (1934).
72. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
73. Id. at 442 (Stewart, J., concurring). The Court found that application of
the statute required "judicial criticism of nations established on a more authoritar
ian basis than our own." Id. at 440.
74. Id.
75. The United States Supreme Court, in Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947),
upheld a California escheat statute similar to the Oregon law in Zschernig because it
did not require the courts to conduct more than a facial examination of the foreign
law.
76. In re Estate of Leikind, 22 N.Y.2d 346, 239 N.E.2d 550, 292 N.Y.S.2d 681
(1968), appeal dismissed sub nom. Laikind v. Attorney Gen. of N.Y., 397 U.S. 148
(1970). The policy expressed in this precedent was not discussed, nor was the case
cited, in the instant case.
77. The point in introdUCing evidence of South Africa's discriminatory em
ployment scheme was only to show the rational basis for the view among
New York's black community that the words "South Africa" are synonomous
for "whites only". There is no issue presented here as to application or
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apartheid was at issue, not the validity of South African law. The
finding of the Commission involved only a facial examination of
South African law, and came within the specifically defined limits
set forth in the decision of both the New York Court of Appeals
and the United States Supreme Court. 78
It is undeniable that in certain circumstances the considera
tions favoring deference to an act of a foreign state, or restraint by
a state court in construing foreign law, are valid principles which
merit close attention by the judiciary. These principles, however,
are limited by the scope of their application. The act of state doc
trine has been employed in the limited situation which involves a
public act of a foreign government committed within its own terri
tory. The sovereign immunity principle inherent in the doctrine
demands deference where the essence of the complaint and the
relief sought are directed at a foreign state. The same realistic con
cern for the sensitivity of foreign relations is reflected in the prin
ciple which imposes sensible parameters on the power of state
courts to scrutinize the validity of foreign law. However, while the
concepts share a common underlying policy, they are distinct prin
ciples of law, and each operates in a limited context.
The confusing discussion of these principles by the New York
Court of Appeals in the instant case obscured the consideration of
the merits of the real issue presented-the discriminatory effect of
the advertisements in New York. The court's dominant concern
with the foreign affairs issues minimized the significant interest of
the forum in determining and implementing its policy on racial dis
crimination. The importance of this interest, relative to the foreign
affairs concerns, was demonstrated by the New York courts in a
case with striking similarities to the instant case. In American
Jewish Congress v. Carter,79 the New York State Commission
Against Discrimination had granted to Aramco, a United States
non-application of South African law. That law is relevant here simply as a
sociological datum-relevant in determining the likely effect of these adver
tisements on New York readers.
Brief for the Appellant, supra note 1, at 42-43.
78. State courts, of course, must frequently read, construe, and apply laws
of foreign nations. It has never been seriously suggested that state courts are
precluded from performing that function, albeit there is a remote possibility
that any holding may disturb a foreign nation-whether the matter involves
commercial cases, tort cases, or some other type of controversy.
389 U.S. at 433.
79. 19 Misc. 2d 205, 190 N.Y.S.2d 218 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1959), modified,
10 App. Div. 2d 833, 199 N.Y.S.2d 157 (1960), afI'd, 9 N.Y.2d 223, 173 N.E.2d 788,
213 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1961).
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corporation producing oil in Saudi Arabia, a bona fide occupational
qualification which allowed Aramco to require job applicants in
New York to state their religion. The government of Saudi Arabia
was not issuing visas to Jews. The result was discrimination in hir
ing in New York for employment overseas because of the operation
of foreign law. The challenge by plaintiff to this exemption was met
with arguments which claimed that the commission could not inter
fere with such delicate matters of foreign policy. The court rejected
this contention and found for the plaintiff. It held that the "vital
interest" of the state to preserve the basic human rights of its citi
zens outweighed the competing concern of the possible secondary
effect on the foreign state and its commercial relationship with
Aramco. 8o The strong interest of this society in maintaining a sys
tem of laws which does not tolerate discrimination, and the specific
responsibility of the courts to enforce this policy, are beyond seri
ous question. In the instant case, the court, which made no men
tion of Carter, 81 interpreted the connection of the advertisements
with the law of South Mrica, however tangential, as sufficient to
foreclose meaningful consideration of the issue of local discrimina
tion.
A major difficulty in the operation of the act of state doctrine,
in spite of its limited scope, is its inflexibility. Where the doctrine
is applied, the judicial deference it requires is fatal to a cause of
action. Where the circumstances do not conform to the limited fact
situations in which the doctrine has traditionally been invoked, the
effects of its application can be manifestly unjust. The inflexibility
of the doctrine results too often in the circumvention of what Jus
tice White has expressed as the "unassailable proposition" that our
courts are required to adjudicate disputes fully on their merits. 82
Recognition of specific limitations of the doctrine based on public
policy, international law, and commercial acts would provide a

80. [d. at 205, 190 N.Y.S.2d at 225.
81. The Carter case was discussed in the briefs of both the Times and the
Commission, with predictably differing conclusions as to its significance. The Times
found the trial court's decision in Carter to be a "singularly intemperate opinion,"
Brief for the Petitioner-Respondent at 31 n., New York Times Co. v. City of New
York Comm'n on Human Rights, 41 N.Y.2d 345, 361 N.E.2d 963, 393 N.Y.S.2d 312,
while the Commission found the facts and issue similar to those in the present case.
Brief for the Appellant, supra note 1, at 37-39.
82. 376 U.S. at 450-51 (1964). Justice White stated his concern about the ap
parent disregard of what he believed to be a fundamental function of the courts in
his dissenting opinion, which advocated adoption of an international law exception
to the act of state doctrine. See note 60 supra.
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large measure of the flexibility which the doctrine now lacks. In
the context of a balancing approach which allowed consideration of
these factors, the court in the instant case would have been able to
weigh the effects of the application of the doctrine against both the
strong public policy of the domestic forum and the existence of an
international consensus on apartheid. This approach would not de
prive a court of the power to strictly apply the act of state doctrine
in situations which warrant full effect of its underlying policies.
The significance of recognizing both the effect of an interna
tional consensus and the reality of increased governmental activity
in commercial ventures is heightened in a rapidly changing modern
world. Nations have been made increasingly interdependent by
modern communications, the problems of overpopulation and lim
ited natural resources, the proliferation of new nations, and the
dynamics of transnational economics. The political reality and rea
soning which fashioned the act of state doctrine reflected a
nineteenth-century world order. The rise of the multinational en
terprise as an almost autonomous geopolitical entity illustrates the
radical change in that order. 83 The act of state doctrine was an
adequate response to the needs of the American legal system in a
time of isolationist United States foreign policy. It lacks the flexibil
ity to meet the challenge of issues which arise in the current inter
national order of complex transnational relationships.
In light of the recent history of our foreign policy, especially
vis-a-vis the third world nations, it is ironic that the judiciary is
deemed so unqualified to deal with matters touching on foreign
affairs as to require almost total deference to the executive branch.
In the interest of not embarrassing the executive, the act of state
doctrine compels the judiciary to defer to the branch of govern
ment whose abuse of power has become itself a burdensome em
barrassment in the world community. The unchecked excesses of
the executive's defense and security agencies in attempting to in
fluence international politics and world opinion are obvious exam
ples of this abuse. The irony of the situation is compounded by the
argument that the act of state doctrine serves the useful purpose of
helping to prevent the imposition of American values on the sys
tems of thought and governance of other nations. The question
presents itself whether our nation is well served in the instant case
by a doctrine which can require a court to refrain from considering
83. See Miller, The Corporation As A Private Government in the World Com
munity, 46 VA. L. REV. 1539 (1960).

1978]

ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE

391

the merits of a domestic claim alleging racial discrimination be
cause the tenuous connection of that issue with South Africa might
possibly prove diplomatically embarrassing to our foreign relations
with the global champion of apartheid.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The decision by the New York Court of Appeals allows a
domestic corporation to print advertisements which effectively dis
criminate against New York City's inhabitants if the employment
offered by the advertisements is located overseas. The court's nar
row construction of the antidiscrimination statute, refusing to give
effect to the connotative message of the words "South Africa," re
stricts the ability of the Commission to perform its broad remedial
function. Convinced of the underlying motives of the complainants,
the court misinterpreted the focus of the discrimination the Com
mission had sought to enjoin. By assuming that the validity of aparth
eid was in question, the court justified its invocation of the act of
state doctrine. It extended the application of the doctrine beyond
its strict self-contained limits to a situation unlike that in which it
has traditionally been employed. In addition, the court confusingly
discussed the doctrine in conjunction with a separate principle
which limits the extent to which state courts can inquire into the
~alidity of foreign law. As a result, neither principle was correctly
applied, and the real issue of local discrimination was unconvinc
ingly dismissed. The decision raises questions of the viability of the
act of state doctrine in the modern international order of increas
ingly interdependent nations. In the absence of qualifying limita
tions based on public policy, international consensus, and commer
cial acts, the doctrine has become, as the principal case illustrates,
overly restrictive. Without limitations confining the application of
the doctrine to its historically narrow context, it has the potential
to completely frustrate the judicial consideration of social issues in
which the United States has a vital and compelling interest.
Peter Q. Montori

